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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Beck's (1967; 1976) cognitive theory of depression states that depressed
individuals have cognitive biases which lead them to view themselves and their
experiences negatively. In contrast, healthy, nondepressed individuals are thought to
avoid such biases and have a relatively accurate picture of the world. The emergence
of "depressive realism" (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Golin, Terrell, & Johnson, 1977;
Mischel, 1979), however, provided evidence which contradicts Beck's cognitive
theory of depression.
Depressive Realism
In their well-known depressive realism studies, Alloy and Abramson (1979)
demonstrated that depressed individuals tend to have a realistic perception of
contingencies in a laboratory. Alloy and Abramson (1979) conducted several
judgment of contingency studies in which depressed and nondepressed individuals
were asked to rate their perceived degree of control over a light turning on and off.
In the series of trials, subjects responded by either pushing or not pushing a button,
and then noted whether the light came on. In several studies the actual degree of
contingency was manipulated, as was the payoff for light onset. Overall, depressed
subjects were more accurate in judging their control than were nondepressed subjects.
Furthermore, nondepressed subjects tended to overestimate their control when they
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won desirable outcomes that were in fact not contingent on their responses, and they
underestimated their degree of control when they lost desirable outcomes that were
dependent on their responses. In this research, depressed subjects were "sadder but
wiser" in that their judgments of control were more accurate and unbiased than
nondepressives' judgments. This research also demonstrated that while depressed
individuals tended not to have cognitive biases regarding control over laboratory
contingencies, normal or nondepressed individuals did. Nondepressed individuals
gave higher judgment of control ratings when having control was desirable and lower
control ratings when having control was undesirable.
Depressive realism has been demonstrated with other types of tasks. A
number of prediction studies have shown that depressed subjects give more realistic
and accurate predictions than nondepressed subjects. For example, Golin, Terrell,
and Johnson (1977) showed that depressed subjects gave accurate confidence ratings
for rolling certain dice outcomes. In contrast, nondepressives tended to be optimistic
and made significantly higher ratings of confidence than depressives. Interestingly,
these findings reversed when the experimenter rolled the dice. That is, nondepressed
subjects were more accurate when predicting the experimenter's success whereas
depressed subjects demonstrated an optimistic bias when predicting the experimenter's
success. Thus, Golin et al. 's (1977) findings suggest that depressives are realistic
when making predictions for themselves but demonstrate an optimistic bias in their
predictions for others. This optimistic bias (seeing desirable events as more likely
than objectively true) is one type of wishful thinking. Interestingly, Golin et al. 's
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(1977) findings suggest that depressives engage in wishful thinking for other people
but when it comes to themselves, they are realistic. On the other hand,
nondepressives appeared to be "wishful thinkers" for themselves but not for others.
Coping Research
Research has also been conducted to determine whether depressives use
different coping styles than nondepressives in response to negative life events. One of
the scales that measures different coping styles is the revised Ways of Coping
Checklist (WCCL; Vitaliano, Russo, Carr, Maiuro, & Becker, 1985). Research using
this scale has yielded significant correlations between depression and the wishful
thinking coping style. That is, as level of depression increased, subjects were more
likely to endorse more wishful thinking items relative to the remaining subscales. In
the coping literature, the wishful thinking coping style has been defined as a tendency
to endorse items that have a "wishful" component (e.g., "Hoped a miracle would
happen").
Vitaliano, Maiuro, Russo, and Becker (1987) used a revision of the WCCL
(Vitaliano et al., 1985) to examine the coping styles of individuals suffering from
various forms of psychopathology (e.g., panic disorders, phobic disorders, etc.).
Interestingly, those who indicated depression (in addition to the primary disorder)
were more likely to engage in a wishful thinking coping style. Furthermore,
Vitaliano et al. (1985) cited 12 stress and coping studies with more than 2000 subjects
in which a positive relationship between wishful thinking and psychological distress
was consistently demonstrated. That is, greater use of wishful thinking as a coping
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style was related to higher levels of symptomology and, more specifically, depression.
Due to the correlational nature of this research, there was no discussion about the
causal factors involved.
Vitaliano et al. (1985) stated that their wishful thinking (coping) findings
reinforce the notions of depression proposed by Coyne, Aldwin, and Lazarus (1981).
Specifically, Coyne et al. ( 1981) also found that depression was positively correlated
with wishful thinking. According to Coyne et al. (1981), by checking wishful
thinking items on the WCCL, such as "Wished I was a stronger person - more
optimistic and forceful," depressives focus on negative aspects of specific stressful
episodes. That is, wishful statements imply that one's current state or outcomes are
in some way inadequate. Their study suggests that this negative self-preoccupation
and accentuation of the negative, which are correlated with wishful thinking, may lead
to reduced effectiveness in coping with everyday stressors (Coyne et al., 1981).
Differences between Depressive Realism and Copin~ Literatures
It is important to make a distinction between the definition of wishful thinking
in the coping literature and the definition from the experimental literature (such as
Alloy and Abramson's (1979) depressive realism studies). Experimental research has
defined wishful thinking as the tendency to rate the likelihood of positive, desirable
events as higher than the actual base rate of occurrence, and the tendency to rate the
likelihood of negative, undesirable events as lower than the actual base rate (Cronbach
& Davis, 1944; Marks, 1951). In contrast to this task-oriented measure of wishful
thinking, the coping literature measures wishful thinking with a self-report method in
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which subjects are asked whether they agree or disagree with wishful statements.
For the purposes of this study, the findings of the depressive realism work
were seen as similar to the earlier experimental wishful thinking research. That is,
with respect to wishful thinking, it was assumed that high judgments of control for
positive events are similar in meanin~ to giving high likelihood ratings for positive
events. Given this view, nondepressives exhibited wishful thinking in the original
depressive realism work since they rated their judgments of control as higher than was
objectively true. Depressives, on the other hand, were more accurate in their
judgments of control (although still slightly optimistic).
Vitaliano et al. 's (1987) findings seem to contradict the notions of depressive
realism proposed by Alloy and Abramson (1979). On the one hand, Vitaliano et al.
(1987) demonstrated that depressives used the wishful thinking coping style. On the
other hand, depressives tended to be more realistic than nondepressives when making
judgments of control (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) and when predicting their probability
of rolling winning numbers with dice (Golin et al., 1977).
The Separation Hypothesis
In an attempt to explain this contradiction between depressive realism and
depressives' use of wishful thinking, a separation hypothesis was proposed.
Specifically, the hypothesis was that depressives "separate" their desires from their
beliefs. The notion of "desire" refers to the desirability of an event, whereas "belief"
refers to the actual likelihood of an event occurring. It was hypothesized that in
making judgments or predictions, depressives may rely on their beliefs and they may
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not allow their desires (e.g., wanting to have control, wanting to roll winning dice
combinations) to influence their likelihood ratings. Thus, the current study examined
depressed and nondepressed subjects' ratings of desirability and likelihood for
different positive and negative events.
Rationale for the Separation Hypothesis
This hypothesis results from noting a difference in the methodologies between
the depressive realism work and Vitaliano et al. 's (1985, 1987) coping research.
Alloy and Abramson (1979) used positive and negative outcome manipulations to
observe subsequent effects on judgments of control. In the experimental wishful
thinking literature, the outcome manipulations, in effect, manipulated desirability
(i.e., if an outcome is "winning," it is more desirable). Nondepressed subjects'
beliefs (i.e., degree of control ratings) were influenced by the desirability (winning or
losing) of the outcome. That is, they judged themselves as having more control when
the outcome was positive (winning something desirable) and less control when the
outcome was negative (losing something desirable) despite the objective contingencies.
This represents the experimental definition of wishful thinking.
The separation hypothesis suggests that depressed subjects do not integrate
their desires with their beliefs in making judgments of control. Rather, their desires
are "separated" from their beliefs with the result that depressives rated their true
beliefs with little influence of their desires. As a result, depressives gave more
accurate estimates of control in Alloy and Abramson's study (1979).
The separation hypothesis may also explain why depressive symptomology
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correlated with wishful thinking in the coping literature. Vitaliano et al. 's (1985,
1987) studies used the revised WCCL (1985) to measure wishful thinking. This was
different from Alloy and Abramson's research (1979) because the WCCL presents
items that have a desire component incorporated into them (e.g., "I wish that I could
change what had happened"). The presentation of a desire statement, in essence,
encouraged depressives to engage (not separate) their desires in making the ratings on
the WCCL. As a result, one methodology found no wishful thinking, whereas the
other found wishful thinking. Nondepressives, who presumably have a more
favorable life view than depressives, may have had less of a need to cope with the
stressful situation by "wishing" for something else to have happened.
Alternative Explanations for the Contradiction between the Experimental and the
Coping Literature
There may be other hypotheses besides the separation hypothesis that could
explain the contradiction in findings between the experimental and the coping
literature regarding wishful thinking. For example, the contradiction may be
explained by the learned helplessness hypothesis (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,
1978; Alloy & Seligman, 1979; Seligman, 1975). Specifically, the associative deficit
hypothesis of learned helplessness suggests that depressives are more likely to fail to
perceive the relation between their responses and the outcomes when they actually do
have control. This would suggest that in the experimental literature on wishful
thinking, depressives appeared to be realistic because they may have failed to perceive
the association between their responses and the outcomes. However, Alloy and
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Abramson (1979) demonstrated that depressed subjects did not exhibit the associative
deficit, because depressives were more accurate than nondepressives in perceiving
their response-outcome contingencies even when, in fact, they did have control.
Additionally, it seems that any effect of an associative deficit would have been
minimized because the depressed subjects that were used in the study were depressed
college students and not clinically depressed individuals.
Another possible explanation for the contradiction pertains to the types of
questions used by Alloy and Abramson (1979) and Golin et al. (1977). These
questions required subjects to make judgments of control and probability ratings,
respectively. In Alloy and Abramson's (1979) study, the subjects were told that if
they learned the contingency, they would have a chance to win some money later.
Golin et al. (1977) had subjects rate their confidence of receiving a winning die roll.
It may be that in both of these cases, depressed-nondepressed differences were found
for likelihood ratings because depressed subjects had less of a desire to win. Because
their desire to win may have been less, depressives may have had less motivation to
be biased and were more accurate in their judgments. This hypothesis was tested in
this study by having subjects make desirability ratings for positive and negative
events. Lower desirability ratings by depressed subjects would suggest that this
hypothesis is an alternative to the separation hypothesis.
The Present Study
This study attempted to extend the coping literature by replicating the previous
methodology, but also by looking at desire and likelihood ratings of various events
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(within the same sample of subjects) to determine whether group differences exist.
Subjects were classified as depressed or nondepressed according to Beck Depression
Inventory scores (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). The
procedures used in the coping literature were replicated by having subjects complete
the revised WCCL (Vitaliano et al., 1985) and the Children's Coping Strategies Scale
(CCSS; Jose, 1992). The experimental procedure was replicated by having subjects
make desirability and likelihood ratings for various events. Additionally, subjects
were given the Life Optimism Test (Scheier & Carver, 1985) to test the degree to
which wishful thinking correlates with optimism. Because optimism is seen as an
aspect of coping, this measure should assist in understanding wishful thinking in terms
of coping.
To test the separation hypothesis, the events were presented to subjects on a
computer terminal where they entered their desirability and likelihood ratings.
Desirability and likelihood ratings were conceptualized as the key factors in
examining the separation hypothesis because it was predicted that depressives and
nondepressives would have different relationships between their desirability and their
likelihood ratings. Specifically, depressives were expected to engage in more
separation than nondepressives, as indicated by the lack of a relationship between
desire and likelihood ratings. Both positive and negative items were included in order
to replicate Alloy and Abramson's (1979) and Golin et al. 's (1977) studies, both of
which included positive and negative outcomes. Dice roll situations and life events
were presented to subjects because dice roll scenarios have an objective probability
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(e.g., the probability of rolling a 3, 6, 7 or 8 with two dice is 50 %) , whereas life
events were potentially more personally relevant than the dice items (e.g., "What is
the likelihood that you will get a job with a starting salary of $27,000 or greater?").
Dice roll scenarios also provided a probability judgment task similar to other
depressive realism work (e.g., Golin et al., 1977).
During a baseline condition, subjects made their ratings for half of the dice
and half of the life events. Following this baseline period, subjects made ratings in
one of three reward conditions (between-subjects): wishful thinking, negativistic
thinking, and random rewards.
The depression literature has used the term "negativistic" to refer to cognitive
patterns that have often been associated with depression (Riskind & Roles, 1984). In
this literature, these patterns have been found in responses to tests of irrational
negative beliefs, attributions, and expectations for positive and negative outcomes
(Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981; Riskind & Roles, 1984). In this
study, the term "negativistic" was used in reference to a particular cognitive style
regarding expectations of positive and negative outcomes. Specifically, negativistic
thinking was defined as the opposite of wishful thinking and it was said to occur
whenever subjects rated a highly desirable event as very unlikely or a highly
undesirable event as very likely. Because depressives were predicted to "separate"
their desires from their beliefs, it was expected that depressives' rating style
percentages would not differ significantly from chance (based on the various
combinations of desire and likelihood ratings, chance percentages are 27% wishful
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ratings, 27% negativistic ratings, and 46% unclassified ratings), whereas
nondepressives were expected to generate higher wishful rating percentages and lower
negativistic rating percentages than would be expected by chance alone.
Baseline

It was predicted that depressed and nondepressed subjects would differ in the
degree of wishful and negativistic thinking that they exhibit during baseline.
Ruehlman, West, and Pasahow's (1985) review of the evaluative tendencies of
depressives indicated that nondepressives were more likely to exhibit "positivistic
evaluative responses" while depressives tended to exhibit unbiased responses which
were neither "positivistic" or "negativistic." To the extent that positivistic evaluations
reflect wishful thinking and negativistic evaluations reflect negativistic thinking,
Ruehlman et al. 's (1985) review supports the separation hypothesis.
The Three Reward Contingencies
The reward manipulation consisted of a "points counter" on the computer
which increased randomly or whenever subjects made the appropriate rating (i.e.,
either wishful or negativistic). This reward manipulation was included to see whether
depressed and nondepressed subjects could determine the rating style (i.e., wishful,
negativistic, or random) that was being rewarded. That is, it was not only important
to determine whether different rating styles existed between groups (baseline), but
also whether those rating styles could be influenced by a manipulation (reward).
The attempted manipulation of subjects' rating styles was also important
because, as Rosenfarb, Burker, Morris, and Cush (1993) indicated, there were no
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previous studies that compared the ability of depressed and nondepressed individuals
to adapt their behavior to new learning contingencies. To examine depressed and
nondepressed subjects' ability to learn new contingencies, Rosenfarb et al. (1993)"
assigned subjects to two groups. Both groups were instructed that their goal was to
gain points by moving a circle on a grid. They were also told that moving the circle
involved pushing buttons and observing the lights. The contingency-shaped subjects
were not given further instructions and their behavior was assumed to have been
shaped by the contingencies. The rule-governed subjects were given the actual rules
for the first condition of the trials. During the second condition, the contingencies
changed. To test acquisition and adaptation to the new contingency, a sensitivity
score was calculated for the subjects.
Rosenfarb et al. (1993) concluded that depressives were more sensitive to
contingency changes than nondepressives. They also suggested that their findings
supported the nondepressives' optimistic self-enhancing bias because the rule-governed
nondepressives were seen as having self-presentational motives (i.e., they continued
using the experimenter's inaccurate rules). At first, it seems that Rosenfarb et al. 's
(1993) study supports depressive realism. That is, the depressed subjects were judged
to have made accurate responses to the contingencies while the rule-governed
nondepressives did not. However, in their study there were no depressednondepressed contingency learning differences for the contingency-shaped subjects.
Depressed subjects (divided into those who had and those who had not been told the
rules) did not differ from nondepressed subjects who had not been told the rules.
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Furthermore, the most important finding that is relevant to the current study was that
during the initial learning period, there were no depressed-nondepressed differences in
learning the contingencies. The only group differences occurred after subjects had
learned the contingencies and the contingencies were changed. Rosenfarb et al. 's
(1993) findings suggest that in the present study there should be no differences
between depressives' and nondepressives' ability to learn wishful and negativistic
thinking contingencies.
Similar to Rosenfarb et al. (1993), Neunaber (1987) investigated both
behaviors and judgments of depressed and nondepressed subjects and found that there
were no depressed-nondepressed differences in responding to different responseoutcome contingencies. In combining the findings of both of these studies with the
proposed separation hypothesis, it was hypothesized that, in the present study, both
depressed and nondepressed subjects would not differ in their response to wishful and
negativistic reward contingencies. That is, it was predicted that both groups would
alter their response style such that they would make more wishful thinking responses
when rewarded for wishful thinking and more negativistic thinking responses when
rewarded for negativistic thinking (with no between-groups differences expected).
Thus, while depressives may naturally separate their desires from their beliefs, when
placed into a reward contingency situation they may be able to engage in any type of
rating style depending on the reward contingency. To test the hypothesis that
depressed and nondepressed subjects would both be able to learn wishful and
negativistic contingencies, subjects were placed into one of three reward contingencies
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(see Table 1).
Reward Contingency 1. In this condition, subjects were rewarded for
engaging in wishful thinking. Using the experimental definition of wishful thinking,
wishful thinking was said to occur when subjects gave similar desire and likelihood
ratings for a positive (or negative) event. For example, wishful thinking was
demonstrated when subjects rated an event as highly desirable and highly likely,
moderately desirable and moderately likely, or highly undesirable and highly unlikely.

It was expected that both depressives and nondepressives would respond to this
contingency condition by increasing their wishful thinking responses during the
reward portion.
Reward Contingency 2. The second contingency condition gave rewards for
ratings reflecting negativistic thinking. Such ratings occurred when subjects' desires
had a negative relation to their likelihood ratings, for example, when a subject rated
an event as highly desirable and highly unlikely or, conversely, highly undesirable
and highly likely. As with the reward for wishful thinking, subjects were also given
rewards when both their desirability and their likelihood rating fell in the middle of
both scales. As suggested by Rosenfarb et al's (1993) and Neunaber's (1987) work,
it was expected that there would be no depressed-nondepressed differences in subjects'
abilities to adopt a negativistic thinking style.
Reward Contingency 3. The third contingency condition gave random rewards
while subjects made the desire and likelihood ratings. Thus, sometimes a wishful
response was rewarded, sometimes a negativistic response was rewarded, and
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Table 1
Scoring Rules for Reward Contingency Condition

Wishful Thinking (Reward Contingency 1)
Subject gives:
Desire Rating

< 3 and Likelihood Rating < 4,

Desire Rating

> 3 and Likelihood Rating > 6, or

Desire Rating

= 3 and Likelihood Rating <

7 and > 3.

Negativistic Thinking (Reward Contingency 2)
Subject gives:
Desire Rating < 3 and Likelihood Rating

> 6,

Desire Rating > 3 and Likelihood Rating

< 4, or

Desire Rating

= 3 and Likelihood Rating <

7 and

> 3.

Note. Desire Ratings were made on a 5 point scale: 1 "Very Undesirable", 3
"Neutral", and 5 "Very Desirable." Likelihood Ratings were made on a 9-point
scale: 1 "Not at All Likely", 5 "50/50 Chance", and 9 "Extremely Likely."
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sometimes a response that did not fit into either of these categories was rewarded. A
more appropriate label for this reward condition would be "reward noncontingency"
because of the random relationship between subjects' responses and the points
counter. Rosenfarb et al. 's (1993) and Neunaber's (1987) findings would suggest that
both depressives and nondepressives would be able to recognize the lack of a
contingency and would therefore not alter their behavior (desire and likelihood
ratings) in any particular direction (i.e., no within-group differences). According to
Ruehlman et al.s' (1985) findings, it was expected that between-group differences
would be found because depressives were expected to make more negativistic ratings
and fewer wishful ratings than nondepressives. To the extent that these betweengroup differences were due to depressives making ratings similar to chance and
nondepressives differing from chance, the separation hypothesis would receive
secondary support from these findings.
Dependent Variables
The BDI scores, wishful thinking coping scores, and the subjects' desire and
likelihood ratings were four important dependent variables in this study. That is, in
order to relate the findings from this study to the existing literature, correlations
between BDI scores and wishful thinking coping scores should replicate Vitaliano et
al. 's (1985) findings. Desire and likelihood ratings were used to determine if
previous findings for wishful thinking based on experimental definitions would be
replicated. Additionally, the separation hypothesis suggests that wishful thinking
coping items contain a desire component. Therefore, it was expected that a
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significant correlation between wishful thinking coping scores and desire ratings
would be found.
Two additional dependent variables in this study reflect the subjects' degrees
of wishful and negativistic thinking, respectively. Specifically, subjects received a
score that reflected the percentage of wishful ratings as well as a score that reflected
the percentage of negativistic ratings which they made. Finally, upon completing the
desire and likelihood ratings, subjects rated their perceived control over accumulating
points. This judgment of control was intended to be similar to Alloy and Abramson's
(1979) measure in which subjects rated their perceived degree of control over getting
a light to tum on.
Hypotheses
The following predictions are offered for the desire-likelihood reward contingencies
(I-IV), coping style (V-VII), and judgments of control (VIII):
I)

Based on the experimental criteria for wishful and negativistic thinking, by
chance alone, 27% of subjects' responses should be wishful thinking
responses, 27% should be negativistic responses, and 46% should be
"unclassified" responses that do not fit into either of the first two categories
(e.g., a desire rating of "3" with any likelihood rating falls into this
category). The separation hypothesis predicted that depressives' responses
would be similar to chance responding in the baseline condition because
their desire ratings were predicted to be "separated" from their likelihood
ratings. Nondepressives were predicted to differ from chance primarily

18
because they were expected to make higher wishful ratings and
fewer negativistic ratings than would be expected by chance alone. This
hypothesis would also support the findings by Ruehlman et al. (1985) that
while nondepressives are more likely to make positive evaluations (i.e.,
wishful thinking), depressives are expected to engage in unbiased
responding which would be neither wishful nor negativistic.
11)

Depressives and nondepressives should have a similar percentage of wishful
thinking ratings in the wishful thinking reward condition because it
was predicted that both groups would respond similarly to the wishful
thinking reward contingency (Rosenfarb et al., 1993; Neunaber, 1987). It
should be noted that this would represent a greater change for depressives,
but not for nondepressives (who are already predicted to be making more
wishful ratings than would be expected by chance).

III)

Similarly, depressives and nondepressives were predicted to have a similar
percentage of negativistic ratings in the negativistic reward condition
(Rosenfarb et al., 1993; Neunaber, 1987). This should represent a greater
change for nondepressives who are expected to increase their negativistic
ratings.

IV)

It was predicted that the random reward condition would have no effect on

either desire or likelihood ratings for depressives or nondepressives. That
is, because subjects in this condition would receive points regardless of
whether their rating was wishful, negativistic, or "unclassified," they should
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not change to a particular rating "style" because they are in a
noncontingent reward condition (i.e., no within-group differences are
expected). However, according to the separation hypothesis and
to Ruehlman et al.s' (1985) findings, it was expected that between-group
differences would be found because nondepressives were expected to make
fewer negativistic ratings and more wishful ratings than depressives. Thus,
between-group differences that are predicted to occur during baseline
should persist during this condition.
V)

It was predicted that depression, as measured by the Beck Depression

Inventory (BDI), would be positively correlated with the Wishful Thinking,
the Avoidance, and the Blamed Self subscales of the WCCL scale.
Depression was also predicted to be negatively correlated with the
Problem-Focused and the Seeking Social Support WCCL subscales. These
results would replicate Vitaliano et al. 's (1985) findings.
VI)

Similar to the WCCL subscales, it was predicted that BDI scores would
correlate with the Aggression and the avoidant-like subscale of Substance
Use on the CCSS (Jose, 1992). It was also predicted that there would be a
negative correlation between the BDI scores and the constructive coping
strategies seen in the Social Support, Rejuvenation, and the Problem
Solving subscales. These predictions are based upon Vitaliano et al. 's
(1985) findings in which depressives engaged in destructive or avoidant
coping strategies.
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VII)

It was also predicted that there would be a significant negative correlation

between BDI scores and Life Optimism Test (LOT) scores. This
prediction would replicate findings from the validation of the LOT (Scheier
& Carver, 1985). This measure was included as an addition to the coping
measures. That is, optimism can be seen as an aspect of coping and
therefore this measure may assist in explaining coping findings. Therefore,
it was predicted that the LOT scores would correlate with the wishful
thinking subscale of the WCCL. It was also expected that the LOT would
correlate positively with wishful thinking percentages and negatively with
negativistic thinking percentages. That is, as optimism increases, it would
be expected that wishful thinking would be more likely and negativistic
thinking would be less likely.
VIII)

Nondepressives were expected to make higher judgment of control ratings
than depressives in the wishful reward condition because it was predicted
that they would be more likely to demonstrate wishful thinking naturally,
which would result in greater rewards in this condition (and consequently,
a greater sense of control). Conversely, it was predicted that depressives
would make higher judgment of control ratings than nondepressives in the
negativistic thinking condition because the separation hypothesis suggests
that depressives would be more likely to make negativistic ratings (27 %)
relative to nondepressives (significantly less than 27%) which would result
in greater rewards in this condition. Finally, based on Alloy and
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Abramson's (1979) findings, it was predicted that depressives would be
more realistic than nondepressives and would make lower judgment of
control ratings in the random reward condition (no actual control over
points counter).

CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Depressed (N=47, 11 males, 36 females) and nondepressed (N=98, 38 males,
60 females) Loyola University General Psychology students were identified using the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961; see Appendix A). The BDI has
demonstrated reliability and content, construct, and concurrent validity (Beck, Steer,
& Garbin, 1988). Subjects with a BDI score of 10 or above were classified as at
least mildly depressed (M = 17.00, SD = 6.27) and those with a score below 10
were classified as nondepressed (M = 4.32, SD = 2.87). Subjects received credit
for their General Psychology experiment participation requirement.
Design
To test the separation hypothesis using the experimental definition of wishful
thinking, this study used a 2 (Group: depressed, nondepressed) x 3 (Reward
Contingency condition: contingent on wishful thinking; contingent on not wishful
thinking; random) x 2 (Time: baseline, reward) x 2 (Item Valence: positive, negative)
x 2 (Item type: life events, dice game) x 2 (Rating Type: desirability, likelihood)
factorial design. Group and Contingency were between-subjects variables and Time,
Valence, Item Type, and Rating Type were within-subjects variables. The primary
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dependent variables were the desire and likelihood ratings. Additional analyses were
performed by transforming the desirability and likelihood ratings into wishful thinking
and negativistic thinking percentage scores in order to assess the relationship between
desire and likelihood for each item. These two scores were assigned to each subject
based on the rules depicted in Table 2. Additionally, correlations between the BDI
scores and coping scales and correlations between the BDI scores and desire ratings
were performed. Finally, judgment of control ratings were also used in a separate
analysis of variance in order to determine if any group differences existed as a
function of the Contingency condition for subjects' judgments of control for obtaining
points when making desire and likelihood ratings.
Materials
In addition to the BDI, subjects completed the following measures:
Life Optimism Test (LOT). The LOT (Appendix B) is a 12 item paper-andpencil test which measures optimism in terms of outcome expectancies (Scheier &
Carver, 1985). The LOT has been shown to have acceptable internal consistency
(Cronbach's alpha = .76) and acceptable test-retest reliability (r = .79). In
comparison to internal locus of control (r = .34), self-esteem (r = .48), hopelessness
(r = - .47), and depression (r = - . 49), the LOT demonstrated a relationship in the

expected direction which adds support for convergent validity. Additional! y, because
these relationships were not overly strong, the LOT appears to have appropriate
discriminant validity (Scheier & Carver, 1985).
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Table 2
Re-scoring Rules for Wishful and Negativistic Percentage Scores

Wishful Thinking

Desire Rating

< 3 and Likelihood Rating < 4

Desire Rating > 3 and Likelihood Rating > 6

Negativistic Thinking

Desire Rating < 3 and Likelihood Rating

>6

Desire Rating > 3 and Likelihood Rating < 4

Note. Desire Ratings were made on a 5 point scale: 1 "Very Undesirable", 3
"Neutral", and 5 "Very Desirable." Likelihood Ratings were made on a 9-point
scale: 1 "Not at All Likely", 5 "50/50 Chance", and 9 "Extremely Likely."
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The Ways of Coping Checklist (WCCL}. The instructions on the WCCL
(Appendix C) request subjects to write down a recent stressful situation. Subjects are
then instructed to give yes or no responses to whether they used a particular coping
style to deal with the stressor they had written down. Subscale scores are obtained
which can be used to determine subjects' most frequently used coping style. The
subscales have been shown to have adequate internal consistency reliabilities (all rs >
.73). Additionally, the scales demonstrated respectable construct and criterion-related
validity (Vitaliano et al., 1985).
Children's Coping Strategies Scale (CCSS). The CCSS (Appendix D) is a
paper-and-pencil coping measure on which subjects rate various coping strategies that
they employ on a 5-point Likert-type scale with descriptors ranging from "never" to
"sometimes" to "always." Subjects were asked to make these ratings in terms of how
they generally react to life events. This scale consists of five factors whose items
yielded acceptable Cronbach alpha levels (all alphas > .601). This measure was
included as an additional coping measure.
Computer Program. Following the completion of these measures, subjects
were seated at a computer terminal at which they made likelihood and desirability
ratings for a total of 40 pairs of life events and 24 pairs of die rolling situations. The
majority of the life events were selected from literature on the effects of positive and
negative life events (Weinstein, 1980) and the remainder were generated by the
author. Half of the life events in the current study were pleasant (positive) and half
were unpleasant (negative). The dice items were chosen such that there was an
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objective probability of 50 percent for the likelihood of each dice roll. In addition,
half of the dice events were negative (i.e., involved losing money) and half were
positive (i.e., involved winning money). Dice and life events were randomly
interspersed. For examples of the events, see Table 3 (for a complete listing of the
items, see Appendix E).
Subjects made the ratings for pairs of items (desirability and likelihood)
consecutively, with rating order balanced. The likelihood scale was a 9-point scale
11

11

with 1" representing "not at all likely," "5 representing "50-50 chance, and "9"
11

representing "extremely likely." The desirability scale was a 5-point scale with "l"
meaning "very undesirable," "3" meaning "neutral," and "5" meaning "very
desirable" (see Table 3).
It may be argued that concurrent presentation of likelihood and desire items
could result in a demand characteristic that would encourage wishful thinking because
subjects would be rating an item on both desirability and likelihood at the same time.
This would make similar ratings more likely simply because subjects would be able to
remember their previous rating. Such a demand characteristic would not only make
wishful thinking ratings more likely, but would also dilute any hypothesized
differences between depressives and nondepressives. In order to minimize such an
effect, subjects were given a brief explanation about the differences between desire
and likelihood ratings. Furthermore, the items were on different scales so as to avoid
similar ratings because of identical scales.
During the reward portion of the experiment, the computer program displayed

27
Table 3
Examples of Positive and Negative Life and Dice Items
Positive Life Item
How desirable is it when you receive an unexpected check in the mail?
What is the likelihood of you receiving an unexpected check in the mail?
Negative Life Item
How desirable is it to be stopped for a speeding ticket?
What is the likelihood that you will be stopped for a speeding ticket?
Positive Dice Item
If you roll a 6,7,9, or 10 with two dice, you win $5.

What is the desirability of rolling a 6, 7, 9, or 10?
What is the likelihood of rolling a 6, 7, 9, or 10?
Negative Dice Item
If you roll a 5, 6, 7, or 10 with two dice, you lose $5.

What is the desirability of rolling a 5, 6, 7, or 10?
What is the likelihood of rolling a 5, 6, 7, or 10?
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a points counter in the bottom center of the screen that would increase according to
the contingency criteria (see Table 1). Whenever subjects made a "correct" response
(i.e., matched the reward contingency), the screen would flash a message that they
made a correct response and their score would increase 50 points.
Judgment of Control Questionnaire (JCO). The final measure required
subjects to judge their degree of control for nine items that assessed different
relationships between desire and likelihood ratings (see Appendix F). For example,
one item asked, "To what extent did the score increase when you rated the likelihood
of a desirable event as high?" This measure was designed to determine if subjects
were able to make accurate judgments about the scoring rules that the computer
program was using.
Procedure
After completing a written informed consent, subjects completed paper and
pencil versions of the BDI, the WCCL, and the LOT. Following random assignment
to one of the three contingencies, subjects were seated at the computer terminal.
After receiving the initial instructions for the computer program, subjects made desire
and likelihood ratings for half of the total pairs of items (i.e., half of the dice roll
items and half of the life events items). These items were randomly selected for each
subject. Subjects were then given the following verbal instructions: "From now on
there will be a points counter at the bottom center of the screen. You will notice that
the computer will give you points from time to time. Your goal is to get as many
points as possible while still being as accurate in your ratings as possible. So try to
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see if you can see the relationship between the points you're getting and the answers
you're giving. At the end of the experiment one subject will receive 30 dollars."
The money was used as an incentive to maintain subjects' motivation in the task. The
winner was chosen randomly due to the fact that depending on the contingency
condition subjects were assigned to, their ability to receive points was affected. After
completing the computer program, subjects completed the JCQ to determine their
perceived control over receiving points. Subjects were then fully debriefed and
dismissed.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
There were two main categories of dependent variables in this study. First, in
terms of the experimental definition of wishful thinking, desire and likelihood ratings
were used. All analyses of these ratings involved standardized scores because the
desire and likelihood ratings were made on different scales. For two additional
analyses, these ratings were transformed into wishful thinking and negativistic
thinking scores that reflected the association between desire and likelihood ratings
(described below). Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
analyze these data. The second category of dependent variables consisted of the
coping measures (WCCL, CCSS), the Judgment of Control Questionnaire (JCQ), and
the Life Optimism Test (LOT}. These scores were analyzed with correlational
methods to determine the relationships between depression and these scales.
Desire and Likelihood Ratings
Analysis of variance (ANOV A) using standardized desire and likelihood
ratings as the dependent variables (repeated measures) revealed no depressed nondepressed group differences for the Time (baseline, reward) and Contingency
(contingent on wishful thinking, contingent on negativistic thinking, and random
feedback) factors. That is, the effects of these manipulations did not interact with the
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Group factor (depressed, nondepressed). In order to focus this discussion first on
depressed - nondepressed differences (i.e., to determine processes that may differ as a
function of depression), effects involving the Contingency and Time variables will be
discussed at the end of this section.
The 4-way interaction of Group (depressed, nondepressed) x Item Type (life,
dice) x Rating Type (desire, likelihood) x Valence (positive, negative) was significant,

E(l, 139)

= 10.19, l! <

.01 (Figure 1). Recall that while Group was a between-

subjects variable, Item Type, Rating Type, and Valence were within-subjects
variables. In order to correct for the possibility of Type I errors due to the large
number of analyses for simple effects, only simple effects with a probability of less
than .01 were considered statistically significant.
Looking first at dice items, there were no significant effects for Group, Item
Valence, and Rating Type. Thus, there were no differences between depressed and
nondepressed subject's ratings, nor were there differences in ratings between negative
(losing) and positive (winning) items, or between desire and likelihood ratings.
However, when life items were examined, the Group x Rating Type x Valence
interaction was statistically significant, E(l, 139)

= 16.43, l! < .001. Additional

analyses indicated that for life items, the Group x Valence interaction for likelihood
ratings was statistically significant, E(l, 139)

= 22.70, l! <

.001. Depressives rated

positive life items as less likely than nondepressives (E(l, 139)

= 24.57, l! < .001)

and negative life items as more likely than nondepressives (E(l, 139) = 9.04, l!

< .01). No Group differences were observed for desirability ratings of life items.
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Therefore, it appears that the major difference in rating styles between depressives
and nondepressives stems from the likelihood ratings for life items and not from
desirability ratings for either life or dice items.
In summary, nondepressed subjects seemed to be "wishful thinkers" for life
items relative to depressed subjects as they rated positive life events to be more likely
and negative events to be less likely to occur. Conversely, the analyses suggest that
depressives seemed to be "negativistic thinkers" relative to nondepressives, rating
positive life events as less likely and negative events as more likely. The reason that
only "relative" claims regarding wishful thinking can be made is that it is difficult to
determine the objective probability of the life events for the subjects. This problem
was part of the rationale for including dice events, which were designed to have an
objective probability (n

=

.50). However, depressed and nondepressed subjects did

not differ in their likelihood ratings for dice events, and the mean likelihood rating
across subjects was 5.11 (on a 1-9 scale with 5 representing a 50% chance),
indicating that all subjects were fairly accurate for dice event likelihood ratings.
Wishful Thinking Scores
An examination of mean likelihood and desire ratings (as above) provides only
incomplete information about subjects' wishful thinking "style." A more appropriate
analysis examines the relationship between subjects' desire and likelihood ratings for
each item. For example, on any given positive item, wishful thinking would be
demonstrated by a subject rating desirability and likelihood as high. Negativistic
thinking for a positive item would be indicated by a high desirability rating and a low
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likelihood rating.
In order to derive a measure of the wishful and negativistic "rating styles" for
all subjects, scores were calculated for each subject which represented the percentage
of desire-likelihood pairs answered in a wishful "style" and the percentage of desirelikelihood pairs answered in a negativistic "style."

These two percentages were

calculated using a similar rules table for classifying desire and likelihood pairs as for
the Contingency condition (see Tables 1 and 2). The only difference between this
scoring and the method used for the reward contingency was that in assigning wishful
and negativistic scores for this data analysis (i.e., the re-scoring of desire and
likelihood ratings), the middle portions of the scales were not counted towards either
type of rating style. That is, when the desire rating was 3 ("neutral") and the
likelihood ratings was 4, 5, or 6, (near "50-50" chance), subjects' ratings were not
scored as either wishful or negativistic thinking.
Thus, wishful scores represent the percentage of items that a subject rated as
being both highly desirable (rating of 4 or 5) and highly likely (rating of 7, 8, or 9)
or both highly undesirable (rating of 1 or 2) and highly unlikely (rating of 1, 2, or 3).
On the other hand, negativistic scores indicated the percentage of items that a subject
rated as both highly desirable (rating of 4 or 5) and highly unlikely (rating of 1, 2, or
3) or that were rated as being highly undesirable (rating of 1 or 2) and highly likely
(rating of 7, 8, or 9). It should be noted that these two types of rating styles did not
account for all of the ratings that subjects made because these scores only included
items where subjects made extreme ratings for both desirability and likelihood. In
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cases where the ratings for either desirability or likelihood fell in the middle range,
no wishful or negativistic thinking scores were given in this re-scoring.
A Group x Item Type x Timex Contingency x Valence ANOVA with wishful
thinking scores as the dependent variable revealed a statistically significant Item Type
(Life, Dice) x Group interaction, .E(2, 139)

=

11.59,

n<

.01 (see Figure 2).

Simple comparisons indicated that there were significant Group differences for life
events (.E(l, 139)

=

11.55,

n<

.01), such that nondepressives had higher wishful

thinking scores for life events than depressives (49.1 % and 40.8%, respectively).
Group differences in wishful thinking were not observed for dice items. Additionally,
there was a significant main effect of Item Type, .E(l, 139)

=

161.59,

n<

.001,

which indicated that both depressives and nondepressives had higher wishful thinking
scores for life items (M

= 46.3%)

than for dice items (M

=

19.5%).

A second interaction was observed between Time and Contingency, .E(2, 139)

=

10.15,

n<

.001. As with the previous analyses of desire and likelihood ratings,

the interaction of Time and Contingency will be discussed at the end of this section
following presentation of all depressed-nondepressed differences.
The absence of a Group x Time or a Group x Time x Contingency interaction
indicates that depressed and nondepressed subjects' wishful thinking styles did not
differ from baseline to reward, nor were they differentially affected by the
Contingency manipulation.
Negativistic Thinking Scores
A similar ANOV A with negativistic thinking scores as the dependent variable
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yielded slightly different results. There was a significant Time x Contingency
interaction, f(2, 139)

=

3.65,

effect of Group, f(l, 139)

=

n<

8.93,

.05 (described below), and a significant main

n<

.01. Regarding the Group main effect,

depressives made significantly more negativistic ratings (M
nondepressives (M

=

=

18.4%) than

13.1 %) across all conditions. Thus, depressives were more

likely to perceive highly desirable life and dice items as very unlikely and highly
undesirable life and dice items as very likely relative to nondepressives (at baseline
and across the three reward contingency conditions).
Rating Style Percentages
Recall that chance responding would be indicated by 27% wishful thinking,
27% negativistic thinking, and 46% "unclassified" responding. Based on the
separation hypothesis, it was predicted that during the baseline condition, depressives'
responses would not differ from chance responding. As predicted, depressives'
ratings did not differ from chance responding (X:(2)

= 3. 76, p >

.05). Also as

predicted, nondepressives' ratings during baseline differed from chance responding
(X2(2)

=

11.77, p

< .05) such that they made more wishful ratings (36.7%) and less

negativistic ratings (12.5%) than would be expected by chance alone (27% for each;
see Table 4).
Ways of Coping Checklist (WCCL}
Correlations between BDI and the WCCL subscales replicated Vitaliano et
al. 's (1985) findings regarding the correlation between depression and wishful
thinking; as depression increased, the tendency to use wishful thinking as a coping
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Table 4
Percentages of Thinking Styles in Comparison to Chance Responding During
Baseline.

Depressives

Nondepressives

Wishful

Negativistic

Unclassified

Thinking

Thinking

Actual: 31.4%

Actual: 18.5%

Actual: 50.1 %

Chance: 27%

Chance: 27%

Chance: 46%

Actual: 36.7%

Actual: 12.5%

Actual: 50.8%

Chance: 27%

Chance: 27%

Chance: 46%

39
response also increased. As predicted, BDI scores were positively correlated with
wishful thinking (r = . 271,
self strategies (I

=

.315,

n < .01),

n<

avoidance (r = .460,

n < .001),

and blaming-

.001), as measured by the WCCL. BDI scores were

negatively correlated with problem-focused coping (I

= -.386, 12 <

.001) and showed

a trend to be negatively correlated with the social-support seeking subscale (I

=

-.175, ll < .06).
Children's Coping Strategies Scale (CCSS)
Four out of five of the predictions for the subscales on the CCSS were
supported. BDI scores were positively correlated with aggression (I
.001) and substance use (r
rejuvenation (I

= .265, p <

= -.284, p <

=

.384, 12

<

.01), but were negatively correlated with

.01) and social support (I

= -.191, p <

.01). The

only prediction that was not supported was the predicted negative correlation between
problem solving and the BDI (I

= -.093, n >

.05).

Life Optimism Test (LOT} Ratings
As predicted, there was a significant negative correlation between the BDI and
LOT scores,

r = -.677, p <

.001. This served to replicate Scheier and Carver's

(1985) validation study of the LOT. Additionally, to the extent that optimism is an
aspect of coping, this finding may help clarify some of the previous findings for
likelihood ratings. Depressed and nondepressed subjects differed only in their
likelihood ratings. The correlation between the BDI and the LOT suggests that the
lower likelihood ratings depressives made for life events may be due to a more
"pessimistic" outlook than nondepressives. However, LOT scores did not correlate
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with likelihood ratings (r =.005, n.s.).
As predicted, LOT scores correlated significantly in a positive direction with
wishful thinking scores (r

= .211, J2 <

thinking scores (r = -.261, J2

.05) as well as negatively with negativistic

< .01). This suggests that the experimental definitions

of wishful thinking and negativistic thinking employed in this study are related to
optimism (measured in terms of coping items). Interestingly, LOT scores were not
correlated with any of the CCSS subscales and only with the wishful thinking coping
subscale on the WCCL,

r

= .192, 12 < .05. Given the relatively low correlations

between the LOT and likelihood ratings, wishful thinking, negativistic thinking, and
wishful thinking coping subscale of the WCCL, it appears that these variables are
conceptually similar to optimism but that they also differ from it.
Judgment of Control Questionnaire (JCO) Ratings
Contrary to expectations, a MANOV A with all of the judgment of control
items yielded no Group x Contingency effects on the judgment of control ratings, .E(2,
136) = 0.72, n.s. However, there was a significant effect of the Contingency
manipulation (E(2, 136) = 16.33, 12 < .001), such that those who were in the wishful
thinking Contingency condition gave higher judgment of control ratings across all
items (M = 52.46) than those who were in the negativistic thinking Contingency
condition (M = 39.33), .E(l, 87) = 11.61, 12 < .01, and subjects in the random
Contingency condition (M = 30.44), .E(l,93) = 33.20, 12 < .001. Subjects in the
random Contingency condition tended to judge their control as lower than subjects in
the negativistic Contingency condition, .E(l, 92) = 4.74, J2

< .05. Additionally,
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given that the Contingency manipulation should have resulted in differential judgments
of control for specific items, ANOV As were performed using individual items as the
dependent variable. All analyses using the judgment of control items individually
yielded no significant differences for Group or contingency manipulation conditions.
Replication of the Contradiction in the Wishful Thinking Literature
The contradiction between the coping literature (i.e., as depression increases,
wishful thinking increases) and the experimental literature (i.e., wishful thinking
observed in nondepressives) was found in this study. Specifically, as mentioned
above, BDI scores correlated with the wishful thinking subscale of the WCCL, which
replicated the coping literature findings. The experimental literature was replicated
with the finding that depressives were less likely to give high likelihood ratings for
desirable events and low likelihood ratings for undesirable events (i.e., wishful
thinking) than nondepressives. It would be expected that the measure of wishful
thinking used in this study (i.e., the relationship between desire and likelihood
ratings) would not correlate with the coping measure of wishful thinking because of
the contradiction already noted. This is exactly what occurred (r

=

.00, n.s.). That

is, this study suggests that there is no relationship between wishful thinking measured
by coping scales and the wishful thinking measured experimentally (i.e., desire and
likelihood ratings).
Recall that wishful thinking coping items were conceptualized as having a
desire component. It was hypothesized that wishful thinking in the coping literature
would be more related to desire ratings than to likelihood ratings. To test the
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hypothesis that the wishful coping items would be more related to desirability than to
likelihood ratings, correlations between the wishful thinking score from the WCCL
and both desire and likelihood ratings were calculated. However, results indicated no
statistically significant correlations between the coping wishful thinking score and the
desire or likelihood ratings (I = -.041 and r =.006, respectively). Essentially, the
experimental wishful thinking measure does not correlate in any way with the wishful
thinking coping measure.
Correlation of BDI scores with Wishful and Negativistic Scores
The correlation between the wishful thinking scores and BDI scores was not
significant (I = -.107, 12 > .05). Interestingly, the negativistic thinking scores were
significantly correlated with BDI scores in a positive direction, with greater
depression associated with more negativistic thinking (I = . 219, 12 < .01).
Time and Contingency Findings
As stated earlier, the interactions for the desire and likelihood ratings that have
been described were collapsed across the Time and Contingency factors because these
factors did not interact with the Group variable. The Time variable refers to the
within-subject manipulation of baseline and reward conditions, and the Contingency
variable refers to the between-subjects reward manipulation (reward for wishful
thinking, reward for negativistic thinking, random reward). There was a significant
4-way interaction involving the variables of Time, Contingency, Valence, and Rating
Type, F(2, 139) = 5.66, 12 < .01 (see Figure 3). Additional analyses indicated that
when examining the baseline period, there were no significant effects for
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Contingency, Valence, and Rating Type (12s > .01). Thus, subjects' desire and
likelihood ratings did not differ at baseline as a function of Item Valence and
Contingency condition (because the Contingency condition had not been implemented
at baseline, no effect of Contingency would be expected). When looking at the
reward period, however, a statistically significant interaction was found between
Valence, Contingency condition, and Rating Type (E(2, 139)

= 4.97, l2 <

.01),

suggesting that the Contingency manipulation produced an effect on desire and
likelihood ratings.
In order to interpret the effects of the Contingency manipulation, subjects'
desire and likelihood ratings were compared in a between-subjects analysis across the
three levels of Contingency (reward for wishful thinking, reward for negativistic
thinking, and random reward). Additionally, subjects' desire and likelihood ratings
were analyzed using a within-subjects design to compare ratings made during baseline
vs. after the reward condition began.
Regarding the within-subjects analyses, no significant baseline-reward
differences were found except for trends (recall the more stringent probability criteria
of .01 because of the large number of tests) toward differences for negative event
likelihood ratings in the wishful thinking condition (E(l, 44)
the negativistic thinking condition (E(l, 45)

=

=

4.85, 12 < .05) and in

4.59, l2 < .05). Specifically, subjects

in the wishful thinking reward condition tended to rate negative items as less likely
relative to their baseline ratings, and subjects who were rewarded for negativistic
thinking tended to rate negative items as more likely relative to their baseline ratings.
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This pattern of change in likelihood ratings is consistent with gaining more points in
the wishful and negativistic conditions, respectively. As predicted by Rosenfarb et
al. 's (1993) and Neunaber's (1987) findings, it is important to stress that this pattern
was observed for both depressives and nondepressives. There were no baselinereward differences for desire ratings (ns

> .05).

Looking next at the ratings made following the implementation of rewards
(reward level of the Time variable), results provided more support for an effect of the
between-subject reward condition. Specifically, further analyses indicated that for
likelihood ratings for positive items, there was a trend for a difference between
reward for wishful thinking and reward for negativistic thinking, such that those in
the wishful thinking condition gave higher likelihood ratings than those in the
negativistic thinking condition (E(l, 91)

= 4.46, 12 <

.05). For negative items, there

was a significant difference such that the subjects in the wishful thinking reward
condition gave lower likelihood ratings than the subjects in the negativistic thinking
reward condition (E(l, 91)

=

8.06, 12 < .01).

In summary, the findings provide partial support for an effect of the
Contingency manipulations. Specifically, subjects in the wishful thinking reward
condition gave lower likelihood ratings for negative events and tended to rate positive
events as more likely than subjects in the negativistic thinking condition. Thus, in
both the wishful and negativistic reward conditions, subjects seemed to adjust
likelihood ratings (rather than desire ratings) to be appropriately wishful or
negativistic given the contingency condition. As predicted, when rewards were
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random, subjects did not significantly change their desire or likelihood ratings.
As mentioned above, when wishful thinking scores were calculated to reflect
the match between desire and likelihood ratings, an interaction was found between
Time and Contingency, I:(2, 139)

=

10.15,

n<

.001 (see Figure 4). A simple

effects analysis indicated that there was no significant effect of Contingency on the
wishful thinking baseline scores (n > .05), which indicates that random assignment
created equal groups (in terms of wishful thinking) prior to beginning the reward
manipulation. However, there was a significant difference between baseline and
reward for the wishful thinking reward condition, such that wishful thinking scores
increased from baseline to reward (E(l, 44)

=

15.20, ll < .001). Also, there was a

significant difference between the wishful and negativistic conditions for the wishful
thinking scores following the reward manipulation, such that subjects in the wishful
thinking condition had higher wishful thinking scores than subjects in the negativistic
thinking condition (E(l, 89)

=

16.99, ll

< .001). Similarly, subjects in the wishful

reward condition had higher wishful thinking scores than subjects in the random
reward condition (E(l, 94)

= 8.78, ll < .01).

These findings suggest that the reward

manipulation affected wishful thinking responses such that those who were rewarded
for it increased wishful thinking relative to subjects who were not rewarded for
wishful thinking.
A similar, although not as strong, effect occurred with the negativistic thinking
scores (see Figure 5). Specifically, there was also a statistically significant Timex
Contingency interaction (I:(2, 139)

= 3.65, ll <

.05). However, in terms of the
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more stringent probability criteria adopted (n

< .01), there were only several trends

in the simple effects analyses. Results were similar to those observed for wishful
thinking scores, but in the opposite direction. Subjects who were rewarded for
negativistic thinking tended to have higher negativistic thinking scores than those in
the wishful thinking reward condition, E(l, 139)

= 6.79, 12 <

.05). However,

subjects in the negativistic reward condition did not differ significantly from subjects
in the random reward condition, E(l, 95)

= 3.02, 12 <

.10. There was also only a

trend toward a difference between the baseline and reward conditions of the
negativistic condition, E(l, 45)

= 5.09, 12 <

.05. Taking the wishful and negativistic

findings together, the findings suggest that the wishful thinking reward manipulation
altered subjects' wishful rating styles whereas the negativistic thinking reward
manipulations had only a minor effect on subjects' negativistic rating style.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
A Brief Review
Findings in the coping literature have indicated that depression is positively
correlated with a wishful thinking coping style (Vitaliano et al., 1985). The coping
literature assesses wishful thinking in terms of the number of strategies a person uses
that have a "wishful" or desire component (e.g., "I wished that a miracle would
happen."). As a subject endorses a greater percentage of the wishful thinking items,
they are said to be more likely to employ wishful thinking as one of their primary
coping mechanisms.
Experimental research has defined wishful thinking differently than the coping
literature. That is, wishful thinking has been defined as the tendency to rate the
likelihood of positive, desirable events as higher than the actual base rate of
occurrence, and the tendency to rate the likelihood of negative, undesirable events as
lower than the actual base rate (Cronbach & Davis, 1944; Marks, 1951).
Alloy and Abramson (1979) have demonstrated that depressives are more
realistic than nondepressives in making judgments of control for positive and negative
outcomes. For the purposes of the present study, the findings of the depressive
realism work were seen as similar to the earlier experimental wishful thinking
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research. That is, with respect to wishful thinking, it was assumed that high
judgments of control for positive events are similar in meaning to high likelihood
ratings for positive events. Given this view, nondepressives exhibited wishful
thinking in the original depressive realism work since they rated their judgments of
control for obtaining positive outcomes as higher than was objectively true.
Depressives, on the other hand, were more accurate in their judgments of control
(although still slightly optimistic). The present study attempted to clarify the apparent
contradiction between depressives engaging in wishful thinking (based on the coping
literature) versus depressives being more realistic (based on the depressive realism
literature).
It was hypothesized that the difference in findings was the result of different

methodologies. The coping studies differed from the depressive realism experiments
because in the coping research, subjects were presented with items that incorporated a
desire statement (e.g., "I wished that a miracle would happen."). The depressive
realism methodology requested degree of control ratings and controlled desire by
manipulating valence of outcomes. It was hypothesized that the difference in findings
between the coping and depressive realism literature could be explained by
depressives separating their desire from their likelihood ratings in the depressive
realism studies. In terms of the depressive realism task (Alloy & Abramson, 1979),
the separation hypothesis would suggest that depressives made accurate judgment of
control ratings because they were not affected by their desires. However, the coping
literature used items in which desire statements were very salient. As a result,
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separation of desire and belief was not possible, perhaps leading depressives to
endorse more wishful thinking items.
Findings
Overall, this study yielded mixed support for the separation hypothesis. The
strongest support for this hypothesis came from the finding that depressives' rating
styles (wishful, negativistic, and unclassified) of desire-likelihood pairs did not differ
significantly from chance whereas nondepressives' rating styles differed significantly.
Recall that chance responding was assumed to indicate a cognitive separation of desire
and likelihood ratings.
One of the key aspects of the separation hypothesis that was not supported by
this study was the expectation that the wishful thinking coping items would correlate
with desire ratings. That is, it was suggested that the coping scales utilized
statements that were essentially desire statements whereas the experimental method
presumably separated desire from likelihood components. This hypothesis was tested
in this study by observing the correlation between subjects' desire ratings for the dice
and life items with their wishful thinking coping score. In essence, this analysis
assumed that subjects' general desirability ratings of items would be related to their
desire for the various wishful thinking coping items. Contrary to the prediction from
the separation hypothesis, this study found no relationship between desire ratings and
wishful thinking coping scores.
An alternative way to understand wishful thinking is to compare depressives'
responses relative to nondepressives' responses. As predicted, depressives engaged in
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significantly more negativistic thinking relative to nondepressives and nondepressives
engaged in significantly more wishful thinking relative to depressives. When these
group comparisons are made it appears that depressives may be characterized as
negativistic thinkers, which would support current cognitive theories of depression
(e.g., Beck, 1976). However, given that depressives were "evenhanded" across
rating styles - neither wishful nor negativistic - and it was nondepressives who
demonstrated high wishful thinking and low negativistic ratings styles, depression may
be best characterized as the absence of wishful thinking tendencies rather than the
presence of negativistic thinking. This is consistent with other research which
suggests depressives fail to use self-serving biases that are typical of nondepressed
individuals (Alloy & Abramson, 1988).
In general, the predictions regarding the correlations between BDI scores and
the WCCL subscales were supported. BDI scores were found to be positively
correlated with Wishful Thinking, the Avoidance and the Blamed Self subscales of the
WCCL. Additionally, the predicted negative correlation between BDI scores and
Problem-Focused coping was supported. There was only a trend for the predicted
negative correlation between BDI scores and the Social Support subscale.
Similarly, most of the predicted correlations between the BDI scores and the
CCSS subscales were also supported. The hypothesized positive correlations between
BDI scores and Aggression and the Substance-Use subscale on the CCSS were
supported, as were the predicted negative correlations between the Rejuvenation and
the Social Support subscales. However, the predicted negative correlation between
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BDI and Problem-Solving was not supported.
Taken together, the findings for the correlations between the coping subscales
and the BDI scores suggest depressives are more likely to engage in behavior that
tends to be passive in terms of addressing the problem (e.g., wishful thinking,
avoidance, blamed self on the WCCL, aggression and substance use on the CCSS)
while nondepressives are more likely to engage in active coping styles that attempt to
change the situation (e.g., problem solving on the WCCL, social support and
rejuvenation on the CCSS). These findings were not only important for replicating
the findings in the literature, but they also support Neunaber's (1987) findings which
suggested that depressives' passive coping strategies may reflect a motivational deficit
as opposed to a cognitive difference in comparison to nondepressives. Therefore,
rather than initiating an active behavioral response, depressives are more likely than
nondepressives to engage in a more passive, nonactive response.
In addition to replicating Scheier and Carver's (1985) findings, the LOT
provided some insight into the wishful thinking coping measure. That is, the positive
correlation between the LOT and the wishful coping measure suggests that these two
constructs share common features. This suggests that engaging in wishful thinking as
a way of coping with a situation involves some degree of optimism. To the extent
that optimism is an aspect of coping, this finding may clarify some of the previous
findings for depressed-nondepressed differences for likelihood ratings. The negative
correlation between the BDI and the LOT suggests that the higher likelihood ratings
nondepressives made for life events may be due to a more "optimistic" outlook than
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depressives.
No group differences were found in terms of the judgment of control ratings.
This may have been due to the complicated nature of the judgment of control ratings
(see Appendix H). For example, one of the items read: "To what extent did the score
increase when you rated the likelihood of a desirable event as high?" After
completing all of the computer desire and likelihood ratings and after reading a
number of these types of items with various combinations of high, low, desirable and
undesirable, the task may have become too difficult for subjects to understand clearly
the relationships involved.
Integration of the Findings
Given the mixed support for the hypotheses, the following will be an attempt
to integrate the various findings and hypotheses into a coherent description of the
study results. First, Vitaliano et al. 's (1987) findings regarding the positive
correlation between depression and wishful thinking as a coping style were replicated.
Second, to the extent that the current experimental definition of wishful thinking
(based on desire and likelihood ratings) replicates the methodology of Alloy and
Abramson's (1979) depressive realism work, the depressive realism findings were
replicated in that depressives engaged in less wishful thinking (measured with desire
and likelihood ratings) than nondepressives for life items. However, both depressives
and nondepressives made realistic ratings for the dice items (see below for more
discussion of depressive realism). Third, and perhaps most importantly, this study
clearly indicated that no relationship exists between the experimental and the coping
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definition of wishful thinking. Different methods for measuring "wishful thinking"
resulted in markedly different interpretations of the relationship between depression
and wishful thinking.
An important issue in wishful thinking research concerns realism, that is, are
depressed or nondepressed subjects realistic when considering the likelihood of
positive and negative events? Is it realistic to engage in wishful thinking coping
strategies? In fact, Alloy and Abramson (1979) found that in some cases depressives
were optimistic (not realistic), but because nondepressives were even more optimistic,
depressives were said to be realistic. The issue seems to be whether one chooses to
use an objective probability against which to compare depressives' ratings or whether
to use a relative comparison with nondepressives. Because the only items in this
study that had an objective probability were the dice items (for which there were no
depressed-nondepressed differences), this study suggests that with dice items, both
depressives and nondepressives were realistic. This finding neither confirms nor
offers contradictory evidence for the depressive realism hypothesis because no
depressed-nondepressed differences were found for the objective dice items.
The depressed-nondepressed differences for life events may be due to life
events being more salient to the subjects, and thereby involved the subjects in the task
more than did the dice items. Salience has been found to influence wishful thinking
(Weinstein, 1980). It may also be that wishful and negativistic biases are manifested
only in scenarios that involve ambiguous, nonobjective probabilities, such as life
events. Previous research has demonstrated that cognitive biases do not occur in
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situations in which there are unambiguous response expectations (e.g., Dykman,
Abramson, Alloy, & Hartlage, 1989). Thus, wishful thinking biases may only occur
for ambiguous life events.
While the lack of a depressed-nondepressed difference in wishful thinking for
dice roll items may not contribute toward addressing the separation hypothesis, it
contributes to a greater understanding of the depressive realism debate. Ackermann
and DeRubeis (1991) claim that Golin et al. 's (1977) findings were not applicable to
the depressive realism hypothesis because Golin et al. had subjects make confidence
ratings instead of likelihood ratings for dice rolls. Golin et al. (1977) observed
depressive realism for their confidence in rolling winning dice rolls; that is,
depressives were less confident than nondepressives. However, Ackermann and
DeRubeis (1991) suggest that Golin et al. observed depressive realism because of
their use of confidence ratings. When likelihood ratings are used, as in the current
study, depressive realism, in which depressives demonstrate less optimistic bias
relative to nondepressives, did not occur for the dice roll items.
Because it seems possible that having subjects make likelihood ratings instead
of confidence ratings may have yielded different results, one of the assumptions of
this study becomes questionable. That is, this study assumed that high judgment of
control ratings for positive events and high likelihood ratings for positive events both
represent wishful thinking. Ackermann and DeRubeis (1991) would likely suggest
that this assumption was relatively weak, as they note that depressive realism findings
may occur for confidence but not for likelihood ratings. Similarly, likelihood ratings
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may not be comparable to judgment of control ratings. This again suggests that
different methods for measuring wishful thinking (in this case, choosing to use
confidence, likelihood, or judgment of control ratings) appear to result in different
findings.
In addition to the wishful thinking depressed-nondepressed differences, it was
found that wishful thinking could be manipulated experimentally. That is, subjects
who were rewarded for engaging in wishful thinking exhibited more wishful thinking
than subjects who were rewarded for engaging in negativistic thinking. To the extent
that the judgment of control questions measured awareness of wishful thinking
contingencies, it appears that subjects were not aware of the contingencies necessary
to receive points. To extend this line of reasoning further, these findings could be
used to support a view that one technique to treat depression would be to set up
contingencies so that depressives are rewarded for engaging in wishful thinking. The
findings of this study suggest two areas for future research. First, it seems that there
has been a lack of studies examining depressives' awareness of and ability to respond
to different contingencies. More research is required to assess differences between
depressed and nondepressed subjects' behavioral response to environmental
contingencies. Past research has focused on subjects' awareness of contingencies, but
more research is needed to examine whether depressed and nondepressed subjects
differ in their ability to learn contingencies, particularly following changes in
contingencies. Second, it is not clear from this study whether altering depressives'
responses affects their mood state. Future studies in this area should examine
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whether manipulating depressives' response styles to be more wishful leads to more
positive moods.
As discussed, one of the key aspects of the separation hypothesis suggested
that the wishful thinking coping items would correlate with desire ratings. Results of
the current study did not support this hypothesis. However, to test this hypothesis
directly, subjects in a future study should be given the WCCL and then, as part of
another task, should rate the desirability and the likelihood of each of the wishful
thinking coping outcomes (e.g., How desirable would it be for a miracle to happen
which would eliminate the stressful experience?). The separation hypothesis suggests
that the desirability ratings for the coping strategies would be correlated with the
wishful thinking scores whereas the likelihood ratings would be significantly less
correlated (if at all) with the wishful thinking coping scale.
Finally, depressed mood in this sample of depressed college students did not
affect ratings of desirability for positive and negative events. To the extent that these
desirability ratings reflect preferences for positive and negative events, depressives
and nondepressives appear to be similar in their preferences. However, the two
groups did differ in their likelihood ratings -- particularly for personally-relevant life
events. If the likelihood ratings reflect differing cognitive processes between
depressed and nondepressed subjects, these findings suggest that wishful thinking (or
alternatively, negativistic thinking), is a function of subjects' beliefs in the likelihood
of positive and negative events, rather than their desires for these events to occur.
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APPENDIX A
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTO}ly
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BECK II-,"YE.'ITORY
Narne _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Date _____________
On this questionnaire arc groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully. Then pick
out the one statement in each group which best describes the way you have been feeling the PAST WEEK.
INCLUDING TODAY! Circle the number beside the statement you picked. If several statements in the group
seem to apply equally well. circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before
making your choice.
0 I do no< fc,:l ,.d.

ll

O I have not lost interest in 01her people.
I I am less interosred in 0<her people rhan I uscu tu be.
2 I have lost most of my interosr 1n o<her people.
3 I have lost all of my in1eresr in ocher people.

1.3

0
I
2
3

I I fc,:l s.od.
2 I am s.d •ll the time Uld I can ·t snap 0111 of it.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't s1""1 it.

2 0 I am n01 pamcularly discouraged about the future.
I I feel discouraged about the future.

2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cann01
improve.

14

3 0 I do

feel like a failure.
I I feel I have failed more than the average penon.
2 As I look back on my life. all I ca.n sec is• lot of failures.
3 I feel I am a complete fatlure as a penon.

4

nOI

0 I get ,. much ..,,is faction out of thinas as I used 10.
I I don ·1 ""JOY th1n1s rhe way I used re.
2 I don ·1 get real sarrsfaction out of anything ,nymoro.
I •m diss.11stie<J or bored wirh everything.

5 0 I don't feel pa11icularly pilty.

I ma.lte decisions about as well as I ever coul<l.
I put off ma.Icing decisions more than I used to.

l have greater difficalty in making decisions rhan before.
I can't m.ue decisions ar all anymore.

0 I don't feel I look any worse rha.n I used to.
I I am worried that I '1n1 looking old or unattnctive.
2 I feel thai rherc aro permanent changes in my appear.1n,c
that make me look unattracrive.
3 l believe that I look ugly.

15 0 I can wort .oout as well as beforo.
I It ta.Ices an extn effort re get sraned at doing somethin11.
2 I have 10 push myself very hard to do anything.
3 I ca.n 't do any work at all.

16

I I feel guilty a good pan of the time.

2 I feel quite auilty most of the time.
I feel pilty •ll of the time.

0 I can sleep as well as usu•I.
I I don 1 slee;, as well as I used 10.
2 1 wa.lce up 1·2 hours earlier than usual and tin<! ir hard to ger
back to slee;,.
·

3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used 10 and cannor

6

0 I don ·1 fee! I ,m being punished.
I I feel I may be punished.

2 I ex~ to be punishe<J.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7

0 I don't feel dis.ppointe<J in myself.
I l am disappcunte<J in myself.
2 I am disausted w11h myself.
3 I ha1e mys.:lf.

8 0 I don ·1 feel I am any wooe than anybody else.
I I am cnucaJ of myself for my wululeues or miscues.
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults.
3 I blame myself for evaythinc bad mac happens.
9

10

0 I don ·1 have 111y U'IOU&ftlS of killi111 myself.
I I ha•e thou1nu o( kiJlia1 myself. bul I would noc c:arry
them OUI.
I would lib lo lr.ill myself.
J I would lull myself if I had the c ~ .

17

0 I don't set moro 11rod than usual.
I I

set tired moro easily

than I used to.

2 I &et rired from doing almost anything.
3 I am too tired 10 do anything.

II O My 'l'PC!ite is no wo= rha.n usual.
I My ~ r e is noc as &ood as 't cse-d 10 be.
2 My appeme is much wo= now.
3 I h.ave 110 &!)petite ll all anymore.
1,

O I haven °I !OSI much weight. if any. lately.
I I h.ave !OSI mon, than 5 pounds.
I am purposely trying 10 1,o,c we:
2 l h.ave lost more than 10 pounds.
3 I h.ave !OSI more th.an I 5 pounds.

20

O I don ·1 cry any more than usual.

by eaunc !es,.

Yes__ ~ " -

O I am no more worried a.bout my health than u,ual.
I I am womed about p/lys,cal problems such a. .1che, and
paim; or uput stomach; or constipation.
2 l am very womed about p/lysical probletns and 11 ·s h.ir<l tu
thin.k of muc:i else.
3 I am so wonie<J about my p/lysicaJ problems 1ha1 I canner
minx about 111ythin1 else.

I I cry rrx:,n r,ow rhan I used to.

2 I cry •ll the time

~et

back to sic:;,.

r,ow.

I used 10 be ~le 10 cry. bu1 110w I aa ·1 cry even thoucJ! I

,.ant to.
11

0 I am r10 rrx:,n ,mtated r,ow than I ever am.
I set annoyed or ,mtared more easily rhan I used ro.

ll

O I h.ave i,oc noticed any recent chanae in my intet'CSI in "'·'·
I I am less iru=sted in sex tlwl I used 10 be.
2 I am much les.s in1e=ted in sex now.
3 I have lost interest in su completely.

2 I feel ,mwed all !he rime now.
3 I don·, ~ ,mwed :u all by rhc th1np rlw used 10 imuie

me.
Rc;,roduct1on .,.,thc,,1 wL'>or's express wria.i:n consc111 is nee permitted. Additional copies u,d/or permission 10 use rhis sc.a!e may be OOtained
from: CE."fr~ FOR COGNTT1VE TiiERAi'Y. Room 602. 133 §oulh 36th Sa=t. P!uJadelplua. PA 19104
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APPENDIX B
LIFE OPTIMISM TEST
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LOT
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the items
given below using the following scale:
0 = strongly disagree

1
disagree
2 = neutral
3 = agree
4

strongly agree

Please be as accurate and honest as you can, and try not to let your
answer to any one question influence answers to other questions.
There
are no correct or incorrect answers.

1.

In uncertain times,

I usually expect the best.

2.

It's easy for me to relax.

3.

If something can go wrong for me,

4.

I always look on the bright side of things.

5.

I'm always optimistic about my future.

6.

I enjoy my friends a lot.

7.

It's important for me to keep_busy.

8.

I hardly ever expect things_to_.go my way.

9.

Things never work out the way I want them to.

it will.

..

10.

I don't get upset too easily.

11.

I'm a believer in the idea that "every cloud has a silve.r
lining".

12.

I rarely count on good things happening to me.
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APPENDIX C
WAYS OF COPING CHECKLIST
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WCCL
Instructions: Please recall the most recent stressful event or
situation that you have faced.

By 'stressful' we mean a situation

which was difficult or troubling to you, either because it made you
feel bad or because it took effort to deal with it.

It might have

been something to do with your family, with your job, or with your
friends.

Please answer the following questions with a 'yes' or a

'no' in regards to this event.
(To be presented in random order)
1. Bargained or compromised to get something positive from the
situation.
2. Concentrated on something good that could come out of the whole
thing.
3. Tried not to burn my bridges behind me, but left things open
somewhat.
4. Changed or grew as a person in a good way.
5. Made a plan of action and followed it.
6. Accepted the next best thing to what I wanted.
7. Came out of the experience better than when I went in.

a.

Tried not to act too hastily or follow my own hunch.

9. Changed something so things would turn out all right.
10. Just took things one step at a time.
11. I know what had to be done, so I doubled my efforts and tried
harder to make things work.
12. Came up with a couple of different solutions to the problem.
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13. Accepted my strong feelings, but didn't let them interfere with
other things too much.
14. Changed something about myself so I could deal with the
situation better.
15. Stood my ground and fought for what I wanted.
16. Talked to someone to find out about the situation.
17. Accepted sympathy and understanding from someone.
18. Got professional help and did what they recommended.
19. Talked to someone who could do something about the problem.
20. Asked someone I respected for advice and followed it.
21. Talked to someone about how I was feeling.
22. Blamed yourself.
23. Criticized or lectured yourself.
24. Realized you brought the problem on yourself.
25. Hoped a miracle would happen.
26. Wished I was a stronger person - more optimistic and forceful.
27. Wished that I could change what had happened.
28. Wished I could change the war that I felt.
29. Daydreamed or imagined a better time or place than the one I
was in.
30. Had fantasies or wishes about how things might turn out.
31. Thought about fantastic or unreal things (like perfect revenge
or finding a million dollars) that made me feel better.
32. Wished the situation would go away or somehow be finished.
33. Went on as if nothing had happened.
34. Felt bad that I couldn't avoid the problem.
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35. Kept my feelings to myself.
36. Slept more than usual.
37. Got mad at the people or things that caused the problem.
38. Tried to forget the whole thing.
39. Tried to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking,
or taking medication.
40. Avoided being with people in general.
41. Kept others from knowing how bad things were.
42. Refused to believe that it had happened.
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APPENDIX D
CHILDREN'S COPING STRATEGIES SCALE
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ccss
I am interested in how you usually respond to stressful episodes. Could you please tell below
how you usually respond to upsetting situations? Please think about how you reacted to the
major life events and the everyday life events that you listed above. Remember: there are
no right or wrong answers, please tell me honestly what you really do.
1

2

3

4

5

never

rarely

sometimes

often

always

1. I cry.

2. I do something that I enjoy.

,, 3. I get mto
. fi ghts or argue with people.
4. I smoke cigarettes.
5. I talk to others about how I'm feeling.
6. I try to change something about the situation to make it better.
7. I avoid the problem.
8. I change myself to make things better.
9. I release my feelings.
_

10. I exercise or play a sport.
11. I take out my frustration on someone or something else.
12. I think about hurting myself.
13. I succeed at telling others how I feel.

_

14. I try to convince somebody to act differently.

_

15. I keep my feelings and thoughts to myself.

_

16. I change my actions to be a better person.
17. I just let my feelings out.

·--~· --

- __ ·... ;;

,

..... - ·---.

._. --·--··

-

---·•---.--

.

-

.: _ ._-___._·._- __ :_
_

- ····---·,;,,. ~---- ·- ·---- ·.. ~: ·. - --

·-'-·· ..

1

2

3

4

5

never

rarely

sometimes

often

always

_

18. I go somewhere in order to relax.

_

19. I throw things or break things.
20. I take drugs or drink alcohol.

21. I find a close friend or family member to talk to about my problem.
_

22. I act to correct the problem in somebody or something else.

,,

_

23. I act as though nothing has happened.
24. I change something about myself to solve the problem.
25. I yell and scream.

_

26. I take a nap or go to sleep.
27. I hurt somebody who didn't have anything to do with the problem.
28. I do something dangerous or risky.

_

29. I show people I'm close to how I'm feeling.

_

30. I solve the problem by getting someone else to change.

31. I go off by myself.
32. I try to act differently myself in order to solve the problem.

(9
~
.819
.782
.753
.601
.691

Copyright by Dr. Paul E. Jose, 6/17/92.
subscale name
1. social support:
2. aggression:
3. problem-solving:
4. rejuvenation:
5. substance use:

items
5, 9, 13, (-15), 17, 21, 29
3, 11, 12, 19, 25, 27, 28, 31
6, 8, 14, 16, 22, 24, 30, 32

2, 10
4, 20

· c___ -._ :

-1Q
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Items administered by computer program

How desirable is it for you to complete college in 4 years?
What is the likelihood that you will complete college in 4 years?

How desirable is it for you to have a successful marriage?
What is the likelihood that you will have a successful marriage?

How desirable is it for you to receive an unexpected check in the
mail in the next month?
What is the likelihood that you will receive an unexpected check in
the mail in the next month?

How desirable is it for you to be positive and optimistic in the
next week?
What is the likelihood that you will be positive and optimistic in
the next week?

How desirable is it for you to feel thoroughly rested after a night
of sleep?
What is the likelihood that you will feel thoroughly rested after
a night of sleep?

How desirable is it for you that your first job after college be
your first choice?
How likely is it that your first job after college will be your
first choice?
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How desirable is it for you to have a healthy young adulthood?
What

is

the

likelihood

that

you

will

have

a

healthy

young

adulthood?

How desirable is it for you to have leisure time after graduating
from college? What is the likelihood that you will have leisure
time after you graduate from college?

How desirable is it for you to have the respect and approval of
your peers?
What is the likelihood that you will have the respect and approval
of your peers?

How desirable is it for you to receive an "A" in the psychology
course you are currently taking?
What

is

the

likelihood

that

you

will

receive

an

"A"

in

the

psychology course you are currently taking?

How desirable is it for you to have a good relationship with your
parents or guardians?
What is the likelihood that you will have a good relationship with
your parents or guardians?

How desirable is it for you to be able to purchase a new car soon?
What is the likelihood you will be able to purchase a new car soon?
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How desirable is it for you to have friends give you a surprise
birthday party for your next birthday?
What

is

the

likelihood that

friends

will

give you a

surprise

birthday party for your next birthday?

How desirable is it for you to travel to Europe in the next four
years?
What is the likelihood that you will travel to Europe in the next
four years?

How desirable is it for you to have someone give you a compliment
today?
What is the likelihood that someone will give you a

compliment

today?

How desirable is it for you to have your parents stay healthy as
they age?
What is the likelihood that your parents will stay healthy as they
age?

How desirable is it for you to receiv~ a letter from a friend you
haven't been in touch with for over a year?
What is the likelihood that you will receive a letter from a friend
that you haven't been in touch with for over a year?
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How desirable is it for you to graduate in the top third of your
college class?
What is the likelihood that you will graduate in the top third of
your college class?

How desirable is it for you to get a job with a starting salary of
$27,000 or greater?
What is the likelihood that you will get a

job with a starting

salary of $27,000 or greater?

How desirable is it for you to have a good laugh today?
What is the likelihood that you will have a good laugh today?

How desirable is it for you to be stopped for a speeding ticket in
the next year?
What is the likelihood that you will be stopped for a speeding
ticket in the next year?

How desirable is it for you to have problems falling asleep at
night?
What is the likelihood that you will have problems falling asleep
at night?

How desirable is it for you to be stung by a bee next summer?
What is the likelihood that you will be stung by a bee next summer?
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How desirable is it for you to be forced to switch apartments in
the middle of the semester?
What is the likelihood that you will be forced to switch apartments
in the middle of the semester?

How desirable is it for you to have problems with your first boss
after graduating from college?
What is the likelihood that you will have problems with your first
boss after graduating from college?

How desirable is it for you if a friend gets sick in the next
month?
What is the likelihood that a close friend will get sick in the
next month?

How desirable is it for you to break a bone in the next year?
What is the likelihood that you will break a bone in the next year?

How desirable is it for you to have less spending money in the next
month?
What is the likelihood that you will have less spending money in
the next month?

How desirable is it for you to be divorced in your lifetime?
What is the likelihood that you will be divorced in your lifetime?
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How desirable is it for you to have an argument with friend in.the
next month?
What is the likelihood that you will have an argument with a friend
in the next month?

How desirable is it for you that the Cash Station runs out of money
when you are in a hurry?
What is the likelihood that the Cash Station will be out of money
when you are in a hurry?

How desirable is it for you to be depressed for a week?
What is the likelihood that you will be depressed for a week in the
next year?

How desirable is it for you to bounce a check?
What is the likelihood that you will bounce a check in the next
year?

How desirable is it for you to ruin your favorite pair of pants in
the laundry?
What is the likelihood that you will ruin your favorite pair of
pants in the laundry in the next year?

How desirable is it for you to have to drop out of college?
What is the likelihood that you will have to drop out of college?
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How desirable is it for you to not find a job in the year after
starting your job search?
What is the likelihood that you will not find a job for a year
after starting your job search?

How desirable is it for you to receive an obscene phone call?
What is the likelihood that you will receive and obscene phone call
in the next month?

How desirable is it for you to realize that the car you bought is
a lemon?
What is the likelihood that you will realize that the car you
bought is a lemon?

How desirable is it for you to look back someday at college and
feel that you should have gotten a different major?
What is the likelihood that you will look back at college and feel
that you should have had a different major?

How desirable is it for you to be sued?
What is the likelihood that you will be sued in your lifetime?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 6,7,9, or 10 if you win
$1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of rolling a 6,7,9 or 10 if you win $1 for
rolling one of these numbers?
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What is the desirability of you rolling a 4,5,6, or 7 if you win $1
for rolling one of these nwnbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 4,5,6, or 7 if you win $1
for rolling one of these nwnbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 3,6,7, or 8 if you win $5
for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 3,6,7, or 8 if you win $5
for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 5,6,7, or 10 if you win
$5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 5,6,7, or 10 if you win $5
for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 7,8,9, or 10 if you lose
$1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 7,8,9 or 10 if you lose $1
for rolling one of these nwnbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 4,7,8, or 9 if you lose
$1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 4,7,8, or 9 if you lose $1
for rolling one of these numbers?
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What is the desirability of you rolling a 6,7,8, or 11 if you lose
$5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 6,7,8, or 11 if you lose $5
for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 5,7,8, or 10 if you lose
$5

for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the likelihood of you rolling a 5,7,8, or 10 if you lose $5
for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,4,6,8 or 9 if you win
$1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,4,6,8, or 9 if you win $1
for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 3,5,7,8, or 12 if you win
$1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 3,5,7,8, or 12 if you win
$1 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,5,6,8, or 10 if you win
$5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,5,6,8, or 10 if you win
$5 for rolling one of these numbers?
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What is the desirability of you rolling a 5,6,7,11, or 12 if ycu
win$ 5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 5,6,7,11, or 12 if you win
$5 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,3,7,8, or 9 if you lose
$1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,3,7,8, or 9 if you lose
$1 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 5,6,8,10, or 12 if you
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 5,6,8,10, or 12 if you lose
$1 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,6,7,9, or 11 if you
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,6,7,9, or 11 if you lose
$5 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,3,5,7, or 8 if you lose
$5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,3,5,7 or 8
$5 for rolling one of these numbers?

if you lose

82

What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,3,7,9,10, or 11 if you
win $1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,3,7,9,10, or 11 if you
win $1 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 4,5,8,l0,ll, or 12 if you
win $1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 4,5,8,10,11, or 12 if you
win $1 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,5,6,9,10, or 12 if you
win $5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,5,6,9,10, or 12 if you
win $5 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 3,4,5,9,10, or 11 if you
win $5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 3,4,5,9,10, or 11 if you
win $5 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,4,6,8,10, or 12 if you
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,4,6,8,10, or 12 if you
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers?
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What is the desirability of you rolling a 3,4,7,9,11, or 12 if you
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 3,4,7,9,11, or 12 if you
lose $1 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 2,3,5,8,9, or 11 if you
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 2,3,5,8,9, or 11 i f you
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers?

What is the desirability of you rolling a 4,8,9,10,11, or 12 if you
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers?
What is the likelihood of you rolling a 4,8,9,10,11, or 12 i f you
lose $5 for rolling one of these numbers?
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JUDGMENT OF CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE
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When

answering

the

following

questions,

think

back

to

the

statements you answered on the computer.

1. How much control did you have over getting the points to add up?

o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----so----90----100
NO
CONTROL

COMPLETE
CONTROL

2. To what extent did the score increase when your DESIRABILITY
ratings were HIGH?

o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----so----90----100
NEVER

AT11'/AYS

3. To what extent did the score increase when your DESIRABILITY
ratings were LOW?

o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----so----90----100
NEVER

4.

To what extent did the score

AT11'/AYS

increase when you rated the

LIKELIHOOD of an event HIGH?

o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----so----90----100
NEVER

AT.11'1AYS
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5.

To

what

extent

did

the

score

increase

when

you

rated

the

LIKELIHOOD of an event LOW?

o----10----20----30----40----so----60----70----ao----90----100
NEVER

6.

To

AI.WAYS

what

extent

did

the

score

increase

when

you

rated

the

LIKELIHOOD of a DESIRABLE event as HIGH?

o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----ao----90----100
NEVER

7.

To

ALWAYS

what

extent

did

the

score

increase

when

you

rated

the

LIKELIHOOD of a DESIRABLE event as LOW?

o----10----20----3o----4o----so----6o----7o----ao----90----100
NEVER

8.

To

.AIWAYS

what

extent

did

the

score

increase

when

you

rated

the

LIKELIHOOD of an UNDESIRABLE event as HIGH?

o----10----20----30----4o----so----6o----7o----ao----90----100
NEVER

9.

To

ALWAYS

what

extent

did

the

score

increase

when

you

rated

the

LIKELIHOOD of an UNDESIRABLE event as LOW?

o----10----20----30----4o----so----6o----70----ao----90----100
NEVER

ALWAYS
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